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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF U'TAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Resptmdent,

-vs.-

Case No. 9894

HUGH F. ROWLEY and DONALD
SPENCER,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS,
HUGH F. ROWLEY and DONALD SPENCER
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Hugh F. Rowley and Donald Spencer each appeal
from a conviction of assault with a deadly weapon and
attempted second degree burglary.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court of the Third Judicial District in
and for Tooele County, State of Utah, sitting with a
jury, found Hugh F. Rowley and Donald Spencer both
guilty of the offenses of assault with a deadly weapon
and attempted second degree burglary, and sentenced
each of the defendants to the Utah State Prison for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, said sentences
torun consecutively.
1
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RE.LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Hugh F. Rowley and Donald Spencer each seek a
reversal of the Judgment and Sentence of the District
Court in and for Tooele County, State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 22, 1962, a complaint was filed in the
City Court of Tooele City, Tooele County, State of Utah,
charging both Hugh F. Rowley and Donald Spencer with
committing the crimes of assault with a deadly weapon
and attempted second degree burglary on the 21st day
of October, 1962.
On November 30, 1962, a preliminary hearing was held
before the H·onorable M. Earl Marshall, City Judge of
Tooele City, at which time both offenses, upon stipulation of the parties, were heard toget'her, and upon order
of the Court both defendants were bound over for trial
in the Third District Court in and for Tooele County,
State of Utah.
Informations were thereupon filed against the defendants by the Dastrict Attorney of the Third Judicial
District charging both the defendants with the crimes
of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted second
degree burglary.
A notice of alibi and a Tequest for a polygraph
examination was filed wri.th ·the District Court by Robert
B. Hansen, attorney for the defendants, and thereafter
a stipulation was entered into by and between the defendants, their attorney Robert B. Hansen and the District
Attorney respecting the admissi·on into evidence of the
2
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results of a polygraph test to be administered to Hugh
F. Rowley, the results thereof to be used by the defendants or the State of Utah, regardless of the results
of said test.
A trial was thereupon held at Tooele, Utah, before
the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, one of the Judges
of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Tooele
County, State of Utah, sitting with a jury, on January
18, 1963, both offenses being joined for trial. Proceedings were then had which resulted in the conviction of
both defendants on charges of assault with a deadly
weapon and attempted se~cond degree burglary, and it is
submitted that certain errors were committed by the
Court during the trial of the case, said assignments of
error being set out and discussed fully in the points hereunder, said errors constituting and being reversible
error.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS HEREIN,
WHICH IS CERTIFIED TO CONTAIN A FULL, TRUE AND
COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF SAID PROCEEDINGS, EX ..
CEPT AS THE SAME ARE DISPENSED WITH BY THE
COURT, DOEtS NOT INDICATE OR SHOW ANY EVIDENCE
THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 77-31-1(1), UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, WERE COMPLIED WITH AS
REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE.

The applicable provisions of Section 77-31-1 ( 1) provide as follows :
77-31-1. Order of trial. - The jury having
been impanelled and sworn, the trial must proceed
in the following order:
3··
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(1) If the information or indictment is for a
felony, the clerk must read it and state the plea of
the defendant to the jury. In all other cases this
formality may be dispensed with.
The Court, after the jury was impanelled and sworn,
mentioned to the jury (R. p. 3, lines 7-9) that each of the
defendant~s had entered a plea of not guilty to the
charges, but there is no mention or evidence in the record
on appeal that the clerk read the 1informations to the jury
as provided for under Seetion 77-31~1(1) for the offenses
of assault with a deadly weapon and attempted second
degree burglary as required under said section and which
is the first order 'Of trial with which the Court must
proceed after the ju~y is impanelled.
The purpose of reading the information and stating,
the plea of the defendant thereto to the jury has been
defined and clarified by two decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of
St,ate v. Solomon, 93 U. 70, 77; 71 P.2d 104, (1937),
stated in substance that under the statute reqUiiring the
clerk to read the information and state the plea to the
jury, the purpose of reading the information being
to inform the jury of the nature ·of the charge and issue
before it for trial.
This posrition was 'again reiterated and reaffirmed
by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Spencer, 101 U. 274, 281; 117 P.2d 455, 458, (1941) rehearing
denied 101 U. 287, 289; 121 P.2d 912, 913, (1942), wherein
the Oourt stated:
The provision for reading the information to
4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the jury, and struting the plea of the defendant
(Section 105-32-1, R.S.U. 1933), is in order that
the jury may be informed of the charge and the
issues before it for trial. Thus even the jury must
unders,t;and from the information, not aided by
the bill of particulars, what and which offense as
defined by the S'tatute it 1is charged defendant
committed.
The Court on rehearing further stat·ed:
The issues established by an informrution or a
complaint and the plea of not guilty thereto constitute the foundation of each crimrrnal trial.
Upon those issues the relevancy of the proffered
evidence is determined.
It is therefore imperative 'to protect the rights of
the defendants that the provisions of Section 77-31-1 (1)
be fully and completely complied with so that the jury,
before the evidence pro and con is presented, is fully
appraised of the charges against the defendant contained
in the information so rthat rit can weigh the' evidence as
received as it relates to the charges.
POINT II.
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FAILING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION AS ·TO THE EFFECT
OF A STIPULATION FOR THE TAKING OF A POLYGRAPH
TEST BY HUGH F. ROWLEY AND AS TO THE PURPOSE
FOR WHICH THE RESULT'S OF SAID TEST ARE ADMISSIBLE AND THE WEIGHT TO BE GIVEN TO SAID RESULTS.

In the case at bar, the following s'tipulation in regard
to 'the results o:f the lie-detector 'test on I-I ugh F. Rowley
wasc made between the defense and the prosecution (R.
86, lines 10-24) :
5
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MR. HANSEN: We would like to ma:ke a
stipulation in regard to a polygraph test with
the defendant, Hugh Rowley.
May it be stipulated, Robert lVIcl\ianama, an
officer in the Salt L~ake Oity Police Department
gave a p'olygraph test to Hugh Rowlery, that 1\Ir.
McManama i's a qualifi·ed person to give such examination; that Mr. Rowley denied he h'ad anything to do with these particular offenses, and
1that Officer McManama was
of the opinion he
was not telling the truth when he made these
S·tatements ;
It is also requested that the District Attorney stipulate at th.e present time, the degree 'of
accuracy of the polygraph tests is approximrutely
99 degrees accurate.
May it he so

stipulated~

MR. BLACK: We are certainly agreeable to
that sttipulationn, your Honor.
It should be noted that the examiner was never called
to testify as rto the results; it being stipulated that he was
qualified, that the accuracy of the tests was approximately 99 degrees accurate, and that he was of the
opinion that Mr. Rowley was lying when he denied anything to do with the particular offenses. The court failed
to give :any instruction relative to the effect of this
stipulaJtion.
There has been a gre at deal of judicial reluctance to
recognize the worth of lie-detector evidence in the court
room. The Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appe·als in the
case ·of Henderson v. St.ate, 230 P. 2d 495,23 ALR 2d 1292
( 1951) in affirming a first degree rape conviction quoted
1

6
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from leading authorities on the subject of lie-detector
tests which pointed out some of the chief difficultie's in
the diagnosis of deception by the lie-detector technique,
which are fully set forth in the body of the opinion.
The Supreme Court of Arizona in a recent decision
explained at great length the effect of a lie-detector stipulationn. StOJte v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P2d 895,
900-901 (1962). In that case the defendant was tried and
convicted of possessing narcotics, who, together with the
county attorney and his counsel, s.tJipulated to a polygraph exmnination, said stipulation providing that the
test would be admissible at the trial. The operator was
permitted, over the obj·ections of the defendant, to testify
as to the results of the examination. The c;ourt then,
pursuant to Rule 346 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal
Procedure, after the jury returned a verdict of guilty and
before sentence was entered, certified the issue of the
admissibility of the tes~t to th·e Supreme Court o.f Arizona.
The court held, this being a case of first impression
in Arizona, that the the results of a lie-detector test upon
stipulation are admissible to corroborate other evidence
of defendant's participation in the crime charged, but
wi~th the folloWJing qualifications and limitations expressed by the court :
That if such evidence is admitted the trial
judge should instruct the jury that the examiner's
testimony does not tend to prove or disprove
any element of the crime with which a defendant
is charged but at most tends 'only to indicate that
7
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at the time of the' exarll'inaUon defendant was not
telling the. truth. Further, the jury members
should be instructed that it is for thern to determine what corroborative weight and effect such
testimony should be given. State v. Valdez, supra.
In the case at bar, there is not only an absence of
an instructlion to guide the jury in determining the
weight, relevance and effect of this stipulation, which is
:essential, but the jury never had the opportunity to hear
.directly from the examiner as to his :flindings or to learn
of the condition and circumstances surrounding the test.
Furthermore, the stipulation is so ambiguous, uncertain
and tindefinite as to the exact results of the test as to
mislea:d and ~onfuse the jury, the. inference being, in the
absence of an instruction by the court, that the stipulation on behalf of the defendant Hugh F. Rowley, was
tantamount to a confes·sion ·On his part.
It is, therefore, submitted that the trlial court committed reversible and prejudicial error in not instructing
the jury as to tlie effect of this stipulation regarding the
lie detector test. The said instruction should have contained the charge that the results of a lie-detector test do
not tend 1to prove or disp:r'ove any element of the crime
with whiich the defendant is charged, but at most tends
only to indicate that at the time of the examination the
defendant was not telling the: truth. It should again be
reiterated and emphasized ~that the stipulation in question
did not reveal the exact results of the test, but only
indicated in the opinion of the examiner, who was not
even present at the trial, that the defendant, Hugh F.
Rowley, was lying when he stated that 'he had nothing to

s·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

do with the particular offenses.
POINT III.
THE COURT, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY (INSTRUCTION NO.5-B) REGARDING THE ELEMENT'S NECESSARY
TO CONSTITUTE ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS TO THE NECESSITY OF FINDING THAT THE CRIME WAS NOT COMMITTED DUE 'TO
SOME AGENCY OR FORCE NOT SE'T IN MOTION BY THE
DEFENDANTS.

Section 76-1-30, Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines
an attempt as :
Any act done with intent to commit a crime,
and tending but failing to effect rits commission,
***
In the case of State v. Prince, 75 Utah 205, 214; 284 P.
108, 111, the Utah Supreme Court in commenting what
constitute·s an attempt undeT Section 76-1-30, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, held that the failure to consumm·ate the
crime is an essential element where the charge is an
attempt to eommit a crime. The court, in instructing the
jury as to the necessary elements constituting the crime
of attempt to commit extortion, stated:
If you believe therefore fvom the evidence
beyond a reas'onable doubt that the defendant intended to commit the crime of extortion as charged
in the information and eoupled with that :intent
did some act or acts charged in the informati'On
but failed to effect the commission of the completed cDime through · the intervention of some
agency nnt set in m'otion by the defendant himself then you should find the defendant guilty of
9
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an attempt to commit the crime of extortion. State
v. Prirnce, supra.
In the case at bar the court in its Instruction No. 5B did not define and m~ke clear this element in its
charge to the jury and therefore committed reversible
error. The instruction is as follows:
Before you can convict a defendant of attempted burglary in the Second Degree, you must
believe from the ·evidence, and be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that e'ach of the following elements are true:
1. That the defendant being considered, on
or about the 21st of October, 1962, in the county
of Tooele, Strute of Utah, did an act with intent
to unlawfully enter the build[ng of the J. C. Penney Company.
'(2) 'That the intent of the said defendant
was 1to enter the said building by forcibly breruking intro the said building.
( 3) ·That the s~a!id defendant at the said
time of the act, if any, was intending to commit
larceny in the said building.

( 4) rThat the said aet, if any, was done in
the nlight time with an intent at said time and
place to enter the s~aid building.

It should be noted that rthe court, while mentioning
the elements of intent to commit tthe crime and the performance of som·e act toward the commission of the
c~ime, did not maker mention or instruct the jury as to
the necessary element of a failure to consummate· the
crime through the intervention of ra force or agency independent of the defendants.
10
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 5-C IN CHARGING THE JURY
AS TO WHAT CONS'TITUTES A PRINCIPAL AS DEFINED
IN SECTION 76-1-44, UTAH OODE ANNOTATED 1953,
THERE NOT BEING SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 'TO SUSTAIN THE GIVING OF THIS CHARGE.

The court in its Insrtruction No. 5-C to the jury embodied in the charge the language of Section 76-1-44,
rtah Code Annotated 1953, which defines principals to
a crime as:
All pers'ons concerned in the' commission of a
crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether they
directly commit the act constituting the offense
or aid .and abet in its commission***
The case of State v. Ba;um, 47 Utah 7, 9; 151 P. 518,
519 (1915) held that before the language of the Utah
statute on "Principles," now Section 76-1-44, Utah Oode
Annotated 1953, may be contained in a charge, the pleadings and the evidence must sustain d.t. In the Baum case
the defendant was convicted of burglary in the seeond
degree~ On appeal the Supreme Court of Ut:ah held that
the jury erred in using the language of the section on
"Principals" and instructing the jury concerning defendant's part in the crime charged, there not being sufficient
evidence to sustain such a charge. The court stated:
There was no evidence to sh'ow, and no one
claimed, that the defendant but aided or abetted
in the commission of the offense, or, not being
present, advised or encouraged its commission.
There, hence, was no occas~on to give that kind
of a charge. Under the circumstances, we think
it was misleading. and harmful. State v. Baum,
supra.
11
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In the ca:se at bar, even assuming that the state has
established, that the defendants were both at the scene of
the crime, there is a lack of evidence to justify the giving
of Instruction No. 5-C by the court to the jury. If the
defendants are guilty, one of them committing the
crimes charged and the other being a principal, which
one ·of the defendants for instance .attempted burglary
and which of the defendants aided or abetted~
In regard to the defendant, Hugh F. Riowley, and his
alleged participation in the crimes, the only evidence
possibly connecting him to the offenses charg~d is that
there mtight have been a similarity between his shoes and
the he-el prints taken from the roof of a building near
the scene ·of the crime (R. 66, lines 19 through 30), together with the evidence of James Portwood, a w1tness
for the prosecution, who testified that there were two
people in the car ·that drove away after the shootJing.
Portwood, however, testified that he could not tell
whether the occupants of the car were men or women
(R. 36, lines 5 through 6), the only other evidence being
that the defendants, Rowley and Spencer, were picked
up in a car that Portwood testified was the same one
that drove away from ·the scene of the crime (R. 37, lines
7 through 17). It is, therefore, submitted that the evidence in this case is not sufficient •to justify the giving
of Instruction No. 5-C and that the court committed reversible errorr in so doting.
It should als;o be noted that Sheriff Fay Gillette on
cross-examination as to whether any attempt had been
made to identify Spencer and Rowley by anyone who

12
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was present at the scene of the crime responded as fol-

lows:

Q. Wias there any attempt made to identify Mr.
Spencer and Mr. Rowley by anyone who was
at the scene of this c~ime tha·t night~ (R.
72, lines 29 through 30 ; R. 73, line 1).
A.

Yes.

Q. Can you tell us when that attempted identification was made~ And who was present,
and whatthe results were~
A.

I think it was the 23rd.
' I think Mr. ,Jensen, and Sidney Smith we-re
present.
But I do not know what the result was, because I was with the prisoners in the line-up,
and I was not over on the other side, S'O I
do not know what the result was.

Q. Who was conducting the line-up~
A. I think Deputy Sheriff Pitt was conducting
the line-up.
MR. HANSEN: I think that is all. (R. 73,
lines 2 through 12).
Deputy Sheriff P1itt, ll'or anyone f'Or that matter,
was called by the State to identify the defendants, Hugh
F. Rowley ·and Donald Spencer, as being the individuals
who committed the crimes.

13
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that in view of the assignments of, eTror as brought out in the points of this
brief that the sentence and judgment of the Trial Court
should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

LOIDS H. CALLISTER and
LOUIS H. CALLISTER, JR.
Attorneys for A.ppella;nts

619 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, lTtah
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